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Chapter Nine
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Robert D. Sloane*
A. Introduction
Between April 6, 1994, when an unknown agent shot down the plane carrying 
Rwanda’s former President Juvenal Habyarimana, and early July 1994, when 
the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) commanded by General Paul Kagame, 
now Rwanda’s president, consolidated its hold on power, the “Hutu Power” 
movement, Interahamwe, and interim government of Rwanda systematically 
raped, maimed, and massacred somewhere between 500,000 and 800,000 
Tutsi and moderate Hutu.1 It was “the most unambiguous case of genocide 
since the [Holocaust].”2 Throughout the genocide, the United Nations did 
little except to extend and adjust the mandate of the U.N. Assistance Mis-
sion in Rwanda (UNAMIR), which had been established the previous year 
to monitor implementation of the Arusha Accords of August 4, 1993,3 and 
(belatedly) to impose a general arms embargo on Rwanda.4 Only the mili-
tary success of the RPF put an end to the genocide.5 Kofi Annan, who had 
 *  The author acknowledges with gratitude the excellent research assistance of Elizabeth 
Grosso, Harvard Law School, J.D. expected 2013.
1  See Alison Des Forges, “Leave None to Tell the Story”: Genocide in Rwanda (New York: 
Human Rights Watch, 1999), pp. 1, 6, 15–16; I. Carlsson, “The UN Inadequacies,” 4 J. Int’l 
Crim. Just. 837 (2005), p. 841.
2  Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will be Killed with our 
Families (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux 1999), p. 170.
3  See des Forges, “Leave None to Tell the Story,” op. cit., pp. 123–25; see, e.g., S.C. Res. 918, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/918 (May 17, 1994).
4  S.C. Res. 918, U.N. Doc. S/RES/918 (May 17, 1994); see generally Roméo Dallaire, Shake 
Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (New York: Carroll & Graf 
Publishers, 2003).
5  Des Forges, “Leave None to Tell the Story,” op. cit., p. 13.
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been Chief of Peacekeeping Operations at the time and served as Secretary-
General from 1997 to 2006, acknowledged both that he personally “could 
have done more” and that the international community bore guilt for “sins 
of omission.”6 
B. Establishment of the ICTR7
On July 1, 1994, in the midst of the genocide’s final days, the U.N. Secu-
rity Council asked the Secretary-General to establish an expert commission 
to investigate the numerous reports of systematic, widespread violations 
of international human rights and humanitarian law in Rwanda.8 On 
November 8, 1994, the Security Council, stressing the commission’s find-
ings and other credible evidence, and “convinced that in the particular 
circumstances of Rwanda, the prosecution of persons responsible for seri-
ous violations of humanitarian law would . . . contribute to the process of 
national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace,” 
passed Resolution 955, establishing the ICTR to prosecute “persons respon-
sible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian 
law committed in the territory of Rwanda . . . between 1 January 1994 and 31 
December 1994.”9 The Council annexed the ICTR’s statute to this resolution, 
defining the scope of its jurisdiction and the Tribunal’s general structure.10
By establishing the ICTR – like the institutionally-related ad hoc interna-
tional criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which had been 
created about eighteen months earlier11 – through an exercise of its Chap-
ter VII powers, the Security Council effectively required all U.N. member 
States to cooperate with the ICTR.12 Based on considerations of efficiency, 
safety, justice, economy, and fairness, the Council later decided to estab-
lish the Court’s seat in Arusha, Tanzania, rather than Kigali or elsewhere in 
 6  “UN Chief ’s Rwanda Genocide Regret,” BBC News, Mar. 26, 2004.
 7  The website of the Tribunal is: http://www.unictr.org/.
 8  S.C. Res. 935, U.N. Doc. S/RES/935 (July 1, 1994).
 9  S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
10  Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible 
for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed 
in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other 
Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States, Between Jan. 1, 1994 
and Dec. 31, 1994. S.C. Res. 955, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) (hereinafter ICTR 
Statute). 
11  S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
12  See U.N. Charter Arts. 25, 39, 41, 48–49.
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Rwanda.13 This may well have been prudent and appropriate for the rea-
sons stated by the Council. But it has led to a relatively widespread, nega-
tive perception among Rwandans, many of whom see the ICTR as remote, 
foreign, and insufficiently responsive to the interests of the victims. Con-
tributing to this perception, the ICTR decided from the outset to focus its 
limited resources on the major architects of the genocide rather than the 
literally thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of rank-and-file perpetra-
tors. The latter would be tried by Rwanda’s national courts or, as matters 
developed, by the traditional Rwandan dispute-resolution process known as 
gacaca.14 Because the ICTR’s statute, consistent with contemporary interna-
tional human rights standards, does not authorize the death penalty, many 
perceived a “perverse disparity” in the fact that
the elites who orchestrated the genocide [would] escape a potential death sen-
tence and . . . serve their sentences in facilities that conform to modern interna-
tional human rights standards, while the (presumably less culpable) rank and 
file [would] languish for years in overcrowded jails, awaiting trial in Rwanda’s 
severely backlogged national system – only to then face death or imprisonment 
in Rwandan prisons that fall far short of those standards.15
In fact, Rwanda, which coincidentally held one of the rotating, non-
permanent seats on the Security Council at the time, voted against the ICTR’s 
creation in large part because, unlike Rwanda’s national courts, the ICTR 
would not be authorized to impose the death penalty.16
C. Organization of the ICTR
The ICTR, like the ICTY, consists of three organs: (1) the Chambers, (2) the 
Office of the Prosecutor, and (3) the Registry.17 
13  S.C. Res. 977, U.N. Doc. S/RES/977 (Feb. 22, 1995); see also S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
14  See William A. Schabas, “Genocide Trials and Gacaca Courts,” 3 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 87 
(2005). 
15  Robert D. Sloane, “Sentencing for the ‘Crime of Crimes’: The Evolving ‘Common Law’ 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,” 5 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 713 (2007), 
pp. 719–20; see also William A. Schabas, “Sentencing By International Tribunals: A Human 
Rights Approach,” 7 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 461 (1997), p. 508; Madeline Morris, “The 
Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda,” 7 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 349 
(1997), p. 364; see generally Jens David Ohlin, “Applying the Death Penalty to Crimes of 
Genocide,” 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 747 (2005).
16  Routledge Handbook of International Criminal Law (William A. Schabas & Nadia Bernaz 
eds., New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 58.
17  ICTR Statute Art. 10.
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1. Chambers
The ICTR has three Trial Chambers. Each consists of a presiding judge and 
two other judges.18 The General Assembly elects the judges for four-year 
renewable terms.19 It elected the ICTR’s first judges on May 25, 1995.20 While 
the Tribunal initially consisted of two Trial Chambers and six judges, the 
size of its docket led the Security Council to add an additional Trial Cham-
ber in 1998. Today, the ICTR has nine permanent judges. Eighteen ad litem 
judges, authorized by the Security Council in 2003,21 assist the nine perma-
nent judges. Unlike their elected brethren, the ad litem judges are appointed 
by the Secretary-General. In the interest of a consistent jurisprudence, the 
ICTR shares its Appeals Chamber, which sits in The Hague, with the ICTY. 
Trial Chambers, in contrast, sit at the Tribunal’s official seat in Arusha, 
Tanzania.22 
2. The Office of the Prosecutor 
The Office of the Prosecutor bears responsibility for investigating allegations, 
charging the defendants, and prosecuting them to verdict and, if necessary, 
on appeal. Indictments must be confirmed by one of the Trial Chamber 
judges based on a judicial finding that the Prosecutor has made out “a prima 
facie case.”23 Initially, the ICTR and the ICTY shared not only an Appeals 
Chamber, but a Prosecutor, in the interest of a common prosecutorial policy 
among the two ad hoc Tribunals. But based on both the ICTR’s docket and a 
perception “that the ICTR was the ‘poor cousin’ of the ICTY,”24 the Security 
Council modified this state of affairs in 2003, and the ICTR now has its own 
full-time designated Prosecutor.25
3. The Registry
The Registrar is appointed for a four-year, renewable term by the Secretary-
General in consultation with the ICTR’s President.26 The Registry’s staff 
18  ICTR Statute Art. 11(a).
19  ICTR Statute Art. 12.
20  See G.A. Res. 51/399, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/399 (Sep. 24, 1996).
21  S.C. Res. 1431, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1431 (2002).
22  ICTR Statute Art. 12(2).
23  ICTR Statute Art. 18.
24  Robert Cryer, et al., An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 113.
25  S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003).
26  ICTR Statute Art. 16.
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provide administrative support to the other two organs,27 including, for 
example, protection of witnesses, “administration of the free legal aid system, 
and the management of the UN Detention facility in Arusha.”28 The Registry 
also serves as a liaison to the press.
D. Jurisdiction
The ICTR has subject matter jurisdiction (jurisdiction ratione materiae) over 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, which, in the context of 
the Rwandan genocide and related civil war, include only violations of Com-
mon Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 or of Additional Protocol 
II of 1977.29 Rwanda is a party to both treaties. The ICTR’s temporal juris-
diction (jurisdiction ratione temporis), as set forth in Resolution 955, covers 
only the one-year period in which the genocide took place, that is, crimes 
within the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICTR perpetrated between Janu-
ary 1, 1994, and December 31, 1994.30 The Tribunal’s personal jurisdiction 
(jurisdiction ratione personae), finally, extends to any person who allegedly 
committed one of the statutorily enumerated crimes in Rwanda, as well as 
to all Rwandan citizens who allegedly committed such crimes in the territory 
of neighbouring States, in 1994.31 The ICTR enjoys primacy in relation to 
national court proceedings, meaning that while it exercises concurrent juris-
diction with national courts, given the prohibition on double jeopardy, or ne 
bis in idem, as that principle is known in international law,32 the ICTR may 
“[a]t any stage of the procedure . . . formally request national courts to defer 
to its competence.”33 Because the Security Council established the ICTR pur-
suant to its Chapter VII powers, member States are legally obliged to comply 
with any such request.
27  Cryer et al., An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure, op. cit., pp. 
104, 113.
28  The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (Antonio Cassese ed.) (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 355.
29  See, e.g., Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War Art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (hereinafter Common Article 3); and Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (hereinaf-
ter Additional Protocol II).
30  S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
31  Id. Art. 1.
32  Id. Art. 9.
33  Id. Art. 8.
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In relation to the enumerated crimes set forth in Articles 2 through 4 of 
the Statute, viz., genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, individ-
ual criminal responsibility under international law may be incurred by any 
defendant who “planned, instigated, ordered, committed, or otherwise aided 
and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime.”34 Article 
6 also (1) vitiates any head of State or other immunity that might otherwise 
attach under customary international law to particular governmental offi-
cials; (2) provides for superior (command) responsibility based on a finding 
that the defendant “knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was 
about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take 
the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the 
perpetrators thereof ”; and (3) makes clear that a subordinate’s plea that he 
“acted pursuant to an order of . . . a superior shall not relieve him of criminal 
responsibility,” though it may be taken into account at sentencing.35
E. Procedural Overview
Article 14 of the ICTR Statute provides that “[t]he judges of the [ICTR] shall 
adopt . . . the rules of procedure and evidence for the conduct” of all phases of 
the trial proceedings, up to and including appeals. Pursuant to that authority, 
in 1995, the ICTR adopted Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE), which it 
has amended periodically.36 The Statute, as augmented by both the RPE and 
procedural case law, establishes the contours of the ICTR’s trial process.
Proceedings begin when the Prosecutor decides to investigate allegations 
received from any of a variety of sources, including governments, intergov-
ernmental organizations, U.N. organs, and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs).37 The Prosecutor’s staff may question witnesses, victims, and sus-
pects, collect evidence, and seek documentary evidence or other assistance 
from States.38 During the investigation, suspects enjoy the right to counsel.39 
If the Prosecutor finds a “sufficient basis to proceed,” then he prepares an 
indictment concisely stating the facts and allegations, which he transmits 
to the Trial Chamber for confirmation.40 Once the indictment has been 
34  Id. Art. 6(1).
35  Id. Art. 6(3).
36  Id. Art. 14; see also Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice, op. cit., pp. 355, 
495–97.
37  ICTR Statute Art. 17(1).
38  Id. Art. 17(2).
39  Id. Art. 17(3); see also RPE Rule 42.
40  ICTR Statute Art. 17(4).
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confirmed (and assuming custody of the accused), the formal trial process 
begins. Articles 19 and 20 of the ICTR Statute guarantee fundamental due 
process rights to accused persons, including the right to a “fair and expe-
ditious” trial, to be informed of the nature of the charges, and to equality 
before the law.41 The ICTR Statute also provides that the any hearings “shall 
be public,” subject to exceptions for good cause as set forth in the RPE.
Under the RPE, the accused enjoys the right to use his or her own lan-
guage, though the official languages of the Tribunal are French and English.42 
Once transferred to the Tribunal’s custody, the accused must be brought 
before the Trial Chamber “without delay” to be charged formally, and at 
that time, he will be asked to plead guilty or not guilty to each charge in the 
indictment. In the former case, the Trial Chamber must satisfy itself that the 
plea of the accused is “informed,” “voluntary,” and “unequivocal,” as well as 
supported by “sufficient facts [establishing] the crime and the participation 
of the accused in it.”43 At all times, the accused enjoys the right to be repre-
sented by counsel. 
If the accused pleads not guilty, the trial process, based on a mixed adver-
sarial-inquisitorial model, continues to a discovery phase. The Prosecutor 
must disclose the existence of exculpatory evidence “as soon as practicable,”44 
while the defense must notify the Prosecutor of any intent to rely on an 
alibi or other special defense, including “diminished or lack of mental 
responsibility.”45 Defense counsel also has a reciprocal disclosure obligation 
to make available to the Prosecutor “any books, documents, photographs” or 
other evidence that it intends to introduce at trial. Each party must apprise 
the other if new evidence or information emerges.46
At the request of either party or proprio motu, a judge or the Trial Chamber 
may issue any orders, such as subpoenas, summonses, warrants, and transfer 
orders, which may be required for the conduct of the trial. The RPE set forth 
a variety of preliminary, in limine, and other pretrial motions that may be 
made, including objections to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction or alleged defects 
in the indictment, and applications for severance in the event of joined pro-
ceedings.47 Pretrial motions will be heard and decided by a judge of the Trial 
41  See ICTR Statute Arts. 19–20.
42  RPE Rule 3.
43  Id. Rule 62.
44  Id. Rule 68; see also id. Rule 67(A)(i).
45  Id. Rule 67(A)(ii).
46  Id. Rule 67.
47  See id. Rule 72.
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Chamber; there is no right to an interlocutory appeal from decisions on such 
motions.48
The Trial Chamber “shall” hold a pretrial conference before trial begins, at 
which it (or one of its judges) may request, inter alia, a pretrial brief, admis-
sions or a statement of other undisputed matters, a list of the witnesses the 
Prosecutor intends to call, a summary of the facts to which those witnesses 
will testify, and a list of exhibits.49 The Trial Chamber also “may” hold a 
comparable conference before the defense presents its case.50 Rule 74 vests 
the Trial Chambers with discretion to receive and consider submissions from 
amicus curiae.51 Proceedings, in general, will be held in public, except as 
required for “public order or morality,” “[s]afety, security, or non-disclosure 
of the identity of a victim or witness,” or under the catch-all rubric of “pro-
tection of the interests of justice.”52 
The trial proceedings generally follow the model of an adversarial crimi-
nal trial. After opening statements, each party presents its case (unless the 
defense chooses to decline to put on an affirmative defense), putting on evi-
dence and examining witnesses in the order specified by the RPE.53 Each 
witness is subject to examination, cross-examination, and re-examination, as 
well as to judicial questioning,54 after which the parties present their closing 
arguments.55 
The Trial Chamber deliberates in private, and a conviction requires that a 
majority of the three judges be “satisfied that guilt has been proved beyond 
reasonable doubt.”56 While the RPE initially provided for a distinct sentenc-
ing phase, it “abandoned sentencing hearings early in its existence based 
on considerations of expedience and cost.”57 Today, a conviction must be 
accompanied by the determination of sentence as to each count,58 while in 
the event of acquittal, the accused must be released forthwith.59 The Tribu-
nal’s judgments “shall be pronounced in public,” accompanied, if applicable, 
by “[s]eparate or dissenting opinions.”60 
48  Id. Rule 73(B).
49  Id. Rule 73bis.
50  Id. Rule 73ter.
51  Id. Rule 74.
52  Id. Rule 79.
53  Id. Rule 85.
54  Id. Rule 85(B).
55  Id. Rule 86.
56  Id. Rule 87.
57  Sloane, “Sentencing for the ‘Crime of Crimes,’ ” op. cit., p. 734.
58  RPE Rule 87.
59  Id. Rule 99.
60  Id. Rule 88.
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The Tribunal may sentence the accused to incarceration for a term of either 
life or years for each count, taking into account aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, as well as “[t]he general practice regarding prison sentences 
in the courts of Rwanda,”61 and it will also indicate whether distinct sen-
tences shall be served separately or concurrently.62 Sentences shall be served 
in Rwanda or any other “State designated by the Tribunal from a list” of 
States willing to accept convicts from the ICTR.63 Orders of restitution and 
victim compensation may also be issued.64 Finally, within thirty days of judg-
ment, either party may file a notice of appeal.65
F. Completion Strategy and Rule 11bis 
In 2000, the ICTY proposed a completion strategy, whereby it would fin-
ish all pending investigations and issue any other indictments by Decem-
ber 2004, complete all trials by December 2008, and finish all appeals by 
December 2010.66 The Security Council approved the plan and encouraged 
the ICTR to develop one based on similar principles. The ICTR’s President 
(and Judge) Eric Mose, who prepared the strategy, submitted it to the Secu-
rity Council in 2003,67 and the Security Council officially adopted the strategy 
by Resolution 1534 on March 26, 2004.68 The Council urged the Tribunal to 
concentrate its indictments on the highest-level defendants and to transfer 
lower-level perpetrators to national jurisdictions pursuant to Rule 11bis of 
the Tribunal’s rules of procedure.69 
Under Rule 11bis, the Prosecutor may refer a case to any State with a basis 
to exercise jurisdiction (including universal jurisdiction) provided only that 
the Tribunal can “satisfy itself that the accused will receive a fair trial” and 
that the death penalty will not be imposed.70 The ICTR added this transfer 
process to the RPE as one way to help clear its backlog of cases, which, it 
seems clear, will not be completed by 2013, the date by which the ICTR is 
61  Id. Rule 101.
62  Id. Rule 101(C).
63  Id. Rule 103(A).
64  Id. Rules 105–06.
65  Id. 107; see generally id. Pt. VII.
66  C. Aptel, “Closing the U.N. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Completion Strat-
egy and Residual Issues,” 14 New Eng. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 169 (2008), p. 171.
67  Id.
68  S.C. Res. 1534, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004).
69  Id. ¶ 5.
70  RPE Rule 11bis.
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supposed to wrap up its work. When the Prosecutor requests a transfer, the 
Tribunal holds a hearing to decide whether the transfer is acceptable. It con-
siders, among other issues, (1) whether the defendant will receive a fair trial, 
(2) the general competence of the proposed national jurisdiction’s judiciary, 
including “whether it has a legal framework which criminalizes the alleged 
conduct of the accused and provides an adequate penalty structure,”71 (3) the 
rights of the defendant, including the presumption of innocence, the right to 
a speedy trial, the right to counsel, and the existence vel non of an adequate 
witness and victim protection program, and (4) that the death penalty will 
not be imposed.72
Rwanda has tried to align its national court system with these require-
ments, including by passing a “transfer law” to create extra guarantees and 
procedures applying only to the ICTR-transferred cases.73 Before 2007, how-
ever, the ICTR would not transfer cases to Rwanda’s national judicial system 
because Rwanda retained the option of capital punishment. After Rwanda 
abolished the death penalty in July 2007, several transfer requests were 
immediately submitted, but the ICTR held that the possibility of prolonged 
life imprisonment in isolation, too, should preclude a transfer.74 Concerns 
have also been raised about insufficient witness protection – despite the exis-
tence of such a program.75 Transfers have, however, been approved to the 
court systems of France and the Netherlands.76
Still, it seems clear at the date of this writing that the completion targets 
remain unrealistic. The Security Council has authorized successive exten-
sions. According to the ICTR’s latest report on its completion strategy to the 
Security Council, all but one trial-level case would be completed by the end 
of 2011 and all appeals by 2013. But the President of the ICTR, Judge Dennis 
71  Prosecutor v. Hategekimana, Case No. ICTR-00–55B-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecution’s 
Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11bis, ¶ 4 (Dec. 4, 2008).
72  Jesse Melman, “The Possibility of Transfer(?): A Comprehensive Approach to the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s Rule 11bis to Permit Transfer to Rwandan Domestic 
Courts,” 79 Fordham L. Rev. 1271 (2010), pp. 1290–92.
73  Law No. 11/2007 of Mar. 16, 2007, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, Mar. 19, 
2007.
74  Hategekimana, op. cit., ¶¶ 31–38.
75  Id. ¶¶ 26–30.
76  Prosecutor v. Munyeshyaka, Case No. ICTR-2005-87-I, Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Request for the Referral of Wenceslas Munyeshyaka’s Indictment to France (Nov. 20, 2007); 
Prosecutor v. Bucyibaruta, Case No. ICTR-2005-85-I, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for 
Referral of Laurent Bucyibaruta’s Indictment to France (Nov. 20, 2007); Prosecutor v. Baga-
ragaza, Case No. ICTR-2005-86-11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of the 
Indictment to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, PP 9–12 (Apr. 13, 2007).
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Byron, has warned that “depending upon the staffing situation . . . we cannot 
exclude further delays in judgment delivery.”77 
G. Significant Case Law
As noted, the ICTR decided very early on to focus on the high-level orches-
trators of the genocide rather than rank-and-file perpetrators. This tendency 
became even more pronounced in recent years, given pressure from the 
Security Council to wind up the ICTR’s work and consequent encourage-
ment to focus only on high-level cases, while transferring the others to com-
petent national courts.78 In part for that reason, much of its case law deals 
with important issues of first impression. The following brief survey can only 
begin to scratch the surface.
1. Akayesu79
Jean-Paul Akayesu served as the bourgmestre of the Taba commune from 
April 1993 through June 1994. In that capacity, he controlled the police and 
bore responsibility for executing the commune’s laws, subject to the prefect’s 
supervisory authority.80 The Akayesu decision is significant for at least three 
reasons. First, it marked the ICTR’s first conviction for genocide. Second, it 
resolved for the ICTR, albeit controversially, one of the most puzzling legal 
issues in the definition of genocide: whether victims constitute a distinct eth-
nic group (or other protected, enumerated group) only if they constitute, 
in some sense, an objectively existing ethnic group or, in contrast, if it suf-
fices that the persecutor subjectively perceives the victims as members of a 
particular ethnic group. Third, in Akayesu, the ICTR recognized for the first 
time that rape could be a modality, or component, of genocide, as well as a 
crime against humanity. The first of these points requires little elaboration, 
except to note that Akayesu also marked the first conviction for genocide by 
any international tribunal, not just the ICTR, since World War II.
77  Judge Dennis Byron, Address to the United Nations Security Council: Report on the Com-
pletion Strategy of the ICTR, (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.unictr.org/ (last visited Mar. 22, 
2011).
78  S.C. Res. 1534, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 ¶¶ 5–6 (Mar. 26, 2004).
79  Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (Sep. 2, 1998).
80  Id. ¶¶ 3–4.
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a. Subjective Standard
The ICTR Statute, which reproduces the definition of genocide in the Geno-
cide Convention verbatim,81 defines the crime as any of the following acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members in a group;
(b) Causing serious bodily harm or mental harm to members in a group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [and] 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”
The ICTR convicted Akayesu of genocide and crimes against humanity, 
including, in particular, acts of extermination, murder, torture, and rape.82 
During the genocide, more than 2000 Tutsis in Taba were killed by the Hutu 
génocidaires. Akayesu did nothing to prevent the killings;83 to the contrary, 
he facilitated and encouraged them.
At first blush, he would seem clearly to be guilty of genocide under the 
ICTR Statute. Yet the crime’s definition presupposes a unique mental state: 
the specific intent, or dolus specialis, to destroy one of the enumerated pro-
tected groups as such.84 The ICTR defined an “ethnic group” in the judg-
ment as “a group whose members share a common language or culture.”85 
By the application of that definition, the Tutsi, the relevant ethnic group 
in the Rwandan genocide, and the Hutu, the génocidaires, do not belong to 
distinct ethnic groups.86 They share the same language, Kinyarwanda, and 
general cultural traditions. In fact, the distinction between Hutu and Tutsi 
had originally been based on family lineage, not ethnicity, and individuals 
could be reclassified based on their socioeconomic status or marriage.87 
The Trial Chamber, however, decided that it would be appropriate to look 
to the Genocide Convention’s travaux préparatoires (drafting history) and, 
purportedly on this basis, concluded that “any group, similar to the four 
[enumerated] groups in terms of its stability and permanence, should also be 
81  Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Art. 2, Dec. 9, 
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
82  Akayesu, op cit., ¶ 8.
83  Id. ¶ 12.
84  See id. ¶¶ 517–18.
85  Id. ¶ 513.
86  Id. ¶ 513.
87  Id. ¶ 81.
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included [in the definition of genocide].”88 It reasoned that, by 1994, Rwan-
dans deemed the Tutsi a distinct “ethnic” group, as reflected, for example, 
in the official classifications on their identity cards. Witnesses also readily 
identified themselves before the Tribunal as being a member of one or the 
other ethnic group. The Tutsis therefore constituted a “stable and permanent 
group,” all of which, according to the Trial Chamber, fall within the scope of 
the definition of genocide.89 As Payam Akhavan, among others, subsequently 
pointed out, this reasoning is deeply problematic, in part because “[t]there is 
no support whatsoever for the proposition that the drafters of the Conven-
tion intended anything but an exhaustive listing of the protected groups.”90
Later cases thus took slightly different, and less problematic, approaches. 
In Prosecutor v. Kayishema,91 the Trial Chamber fit the Tutsis into the eth-
nic group category by defining “ethnic group” very broadly, viz., as a group 
“whose members share a common language and culture; or, a group which 
distinguishes itself, as such (self identification); or, a group identified as such 
by others, including perpetrators of the crimes (identification by others).”92 
In Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, the Trial Chamber took yet another approach, 
stressing that the identity of the enumerated groups depended, in part, on 
context and should be construed, “in essence, [as] a subjective rather than 
an objective concept. The victim is perceived by the perpetrator of genocide 
as belonging to a group slated for destruction. In some instances, the victim 
may perceive himself/herself as belonging to the said group.”93 But consis-
tent with the travaux, the Rutaganda court excluded political and economic 
groups from the ambit of the Genocide Convention’s definition. It described 
the latter as “ ‘mobile groups’ which one joins though individual, political 
commitment,” affirming the general conclusion that ethnic groups should 
be relatively stable and permanent.94 While the ICTR ultimately rejected the 
sheer breadth of the Akayesu Trial Chamber’s standard, it retained the fun-
damental principle that the self- or other-identification of an ethnic group 
may suffice to satisfy Article 2’s requirement in this regard – even if anthro-
pologists, for example, would not describe two groups as distinct ethnic 
88  Id., at ¶ 701.
89  Id., at ¶ 702.
90  Payam Akhavan, “The Crime of Genocide in the ICTR Jurisprudence,” 3 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 
989 (2005), p. 1001.
91  Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment (May 21, 1999).
92  Id. ¶ 98; see also Akhavan, “The Crime of Genocide in the ICTR Jurisprudence,” op. cit., 
p. 1001.
93  Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR 96–3, Judgment, ¶ 56 (Dec. 6, 1999). 
94  Id. ¶ 57.
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groups in a purely scientific, objective sense (as is true in the case of the 
Hutu and Tutsi). 
b. Rape as a Modality of Genocide
Akayesu also merits special attention because it marked the first conviction 
for rape as a crime against humanity and the first case in which the ICTR 
conceptualized rape as a potential component or modality of genocide.95 
While rape is a crime against humanity under the ICTR Statute,96 classify-
ing it as a modality of genocide remains significant, both expressively and 
because it may be more likely to trigger early intervention on the part of 
other States in future circumstances of mass atrocity.97 The Trial Chamber 
found, in particular, that “rape and sexual violence” could be methods of 
inflicting “serious bodily and mental harm” within the meaning of Article 2 
of the Genocide Convention (and the ICTR Statute) and therefore could 
“constitute genocide in the same way as any other act as long as they were 
committed with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particu-
lar group, targeted as such.”98
Reaching this conclusion required the Trial Chamber first to define rape, 
for until then, it had not been defined for purposes of international criminal 
law. Finding that the crime “cannot be captured in a mechanical description 
of objects and body parts,” the Chamber instead analogized rape roughly to 
the definition of torture in the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,99 which simi-
larly “does not catalogue specific acts in its definition of torture, focusing 
rather on the conceptual frame work of State sanctioned violence.”100 It then 
defined rape broadly as “a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed 
on a person under circumstances which are coercive.”101 To be a modality of 
perpetrating crimes against humanity, of course, it must also be (1) part of a 
widespread or systematic attack; (2) on a civilian population; (3) on certain 
 95  Stephanie K. Wood, “A Woman Scorned for the ‘Least Condemned’ War Crime: Prec-
edent and Problems with Prosecuting Rape as a Serious War Crime in the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,” 13 Colum. J. Gender & L. 274, 277 (2004).
 96  ICTR Statute Art. 3(g).
 97  Alexandra A. Miller, “From the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to the Inter-
national Criminal Court: Expanding the Definition of Genocide to Include Rape,” 108 
Penn St. L. Rev. 349, 362 (2003).
 98  Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 731 (Sep. 2, 1998).
 99  Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment Art. 1(1), G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51), at 197, U.N. Doc. 
A/39/51 (1984); see Akayesu, op cit., ¶¶ 596–97.
100  Akayesu, op. cit., ¶ 597.
101  Id. ¶ 598.
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catalogued discriminatory grounds, namely: national, ethnic, political, racial, 
or religious grounds.”102 The ICTR also noted that rape “in fact constitutes 
torture when inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acqui-
escence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”103
The definition’s use of general terms like “physical invasion” and its 
acknowledgement that sexual assaults do not require direct physical force 
make it relatively progressive.104 Indeed, both the ICTY and the ICC elected 
to define rape more narrowly.105 But the Akayesu definition may well have 
influenced national and international standards for prosecuting sexual 
violence. It has been cited by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights (IACHR), as well as in the U.S. Joint Services Law 
of War Manual.106
Press coverage of the ICTR credited the recognition of rape as the high-
est level of crime to the pressure that human rights and women’s organi-
zations placed on the Prosecutor. A 1998 New York Times article quoted 
human rights expert Felice Gaer as saying that the “Tribunals were literally 
forced to pay attention to a series of petitions and pressures from women’s 
organizations demanding that rape be recognized.”107 The Akayesu decision 
noted the “interest shown” by NGOs as “indicative of public concern over 
the historical exclusion of rape and other forms of sexual violence from the 
investigation and prosecution of war crimes.”108
2. Kayishema & Ruzindana109 
Because the ICTR, unlike the ICTY, dealt exclusively with the law of armed 
conflict, or international humanitarian law (IHL), in an internal conflict, 
the international war crimes jurisprudence developed by the ICTY has 
not always, or even often, answered some of the same difficult questions 
of first impression regarding IHL that the ICTR has faced. In Prosecutor v. 
Kayishema, the Trial Chamber established the background or circumstantial 
102  Id.
103  Id.
104  Wood, “A Woman Scorned for the ‘Least Condemned’ War Crime: Precedent and Prob-
lems with Prosecuting Rape as a Serious War Crime in the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda,” op. cit., p. 295.
105  Id., p. 296.
106  Id., p. 293.
107  Barbara Crossette, Violation; An Old Scourge of War Becomes Its Latest Crime, N.Y. Times, 
June 14, 1998, p. 2.
108  Akayesu, op. cit., ¶ 417.
109  Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A (June 1, 2001).
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elements – sometimes referred to as the chapeau, which must be established 
in addition to whatever actus reus and mens rea may be required – that 
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order to establish a violation 
of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 or of provisions 
of Additional Protocol II: first, the existence of an armed conflict “not of an 
international character” at the time of the violation; second, a “link between 
the accused and the armed forces” of one party to the relevant conflict; third, 
that the crimes were committed ratione personae and ratione loci, that is, 
over victims qualifying as civilians or the civilian population relative to the 
relevant armed conflict and within the place (here, Rwanda) in which the 
conflict occurs; and fourth, a nexus between the crime and the conflict.110
a. Non-International Armed Conflict
The ICTR defined a non-international armed conflict broadly as one “between 
[a High Contracting Party’s] armed forces and dissident armed forces or 
other organised armed groups,”111 in contradistinction to “situations of inter-
nal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of 
violence and other acts of a similar nature,” which fall below the “minimum 
threshold.”112 
It should be noted in this regard that although it makes little difference in 
the case of the genocide in Rwanda, it is not at all clear that the threshold 
for Common Article 3’s application is identical to that established by Addi-
tional Protocol II; most international lawyers agree that the former’s scope 
exceeds the latter’s. For although Additional Protocol II indeed says that it 
“develops and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions,”113 
as the ICTR noted in Kayishema & Ruzindana,114 Common Article 3’s text 
requires only an “armed conflict not of an international character occurring 
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,” while Additional 
Protocol II adds that the conflict must be “between [the High Contracting 
Party’s] armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed 
groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part 
of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted mili-
tary operations and to implement this Protocol.”115 The latter criterion does 
not qualify Common Article 3, which, as the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately 
held, bringing its jurisprudence into line with the prevailing interpretation 
110  Kayishema & Ruzindana, op. cit., ¶ 169.
111  Id. ¶ 170.
112  Id. ¶ 171.
113  Additional Protocol II Art. 1(1).
114  Kayishema & Ruzindana, op. cit., ¶ 170.
115  Additional Protocol II Art. 1(1).
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of Common Article 3 as expressed by, among others, the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “[t]he term ‘conflict not of an international 
character’ is used here in contradistinction to a conflict between nations’” – 
not, as the United States had argued in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, exclusively to 
civil wars.116
b. Link Between the Accused and the Armed Forces
The ICTR further concluded that if the defendants do not belong to the armed 
forces of one of the parties to the conflict, the Prosecutor must at a minimum 
establish “a link between them and the armed forces.”117 Consequently, quot-
ing Akayesu, the Tribunal said that Additional Protocol II extends to “indi-
viduals who were legitimately mandated and expected as public officials or 
agents or persons otherwise holding public authority or de facto representing 
the Government to support or fulfil the war efforts.”118 The upshot is that 
civilians, and not only members of an armed force, may be liable for viola-
tions of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II.119
c. Ratione Personae and Ratione Loci
The Tribunal noted that in addition to personal jurisdiction over the defen-
dants, Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II raise the question of 
the necessary status of the victims. Here, the Trial Chamber concluded that, 
“for the purpose of protection of victims of armed conflict,” and consistent 
with the ICRC’s views, the words “civilian” and “civilian population” in these 
treaties must be defined in the negative, that is, as all persons “who are not 
members of the armed forces.”120 In a similar vein, while neither Common 
Article 3 nor Additional Protocol II contains a clear provision on “applicabil-
ity ratione loci,” the language of Common Article 3 referring to the enumer-
ated acts in that provision being prohibited “at any time and in any place 
whatsoever”121 makes clear that the relevant war crimes need not take place 
in “the actual theatre of operations.”122
d. Nexus Requirement
Finally, the Tribunal held that a nexus must be established between the 
crimes and the relevant armed conflict. To prove a nexus, there must be a 
116  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630–31 (2006).
117  Kayishema & Ruzindana, op. cit., ¶ 175.
118  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
119  Id. ¶ 176.
120  Id. ¶¶ 179–80 (internal quotation marks omitted).
121  E.g., GCIV Art. 3.
122  Kayishema & Ruzindana, op. cit., ¶ 182.
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“direct link” between the offenses and the conflict.123 Establishing the requi-
site nexus requires evidence, a factual showing, rather than the application 
of an abstract test, and therefore “it is for the Trial Chamber, on a case-by-
case basis, to adjudge on the facts submitted as to whether a nexus existed.”124 
In Kayishema & Ruzindana, the allegations were found to show “only that 
the armed conflict had been used as a pretext to unleash an official policy of 
genocide” but not to constitute evidence of a “direct link between the alleged 
crimes and the armed conflict.”125
In the context of the Rwandan genocide, the Prosecution has not found 
this standard readily met in all cases. It failed, for example, to establish a 
nexus in Akayesu: providing some support to government forces in Taba 
did not suffice to render Akayesu’s crimes sufficiently related to the civil 
war.126 In the 2003 appeal of Georges Rutaganda, the Tribunal clarified that 
the focus of the nexus analysis must be on the specific actions of the accused, 
not the abstract link between the genocide and the armed conflict overall.127 
Consequently, the Trial Chamber stressed that while “[g]enocide against the 
Tutsis and the conflict between the RAF and the RPF are undeniably linked, 
the Prosecutor cannot merely rely on a finding of genocide and consider that, 
as such, serious violations of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II 
are thereby automatically established.”128 The Appeals Chamber, however, 
found a sufficient link between Rutaganda’s actions and the armed conflict in 
Rwanda. “Given the activities of the Interahamwe and the position of author-
ity held by Rutaganda, its second vice president, a close link was established 
between his culpable acts and the armed conflict.”129 The Tribunal therefore 
reversed the Trial Chamber on this point, marking the first conviction for 
war crimes at the ICTR.130
123  Id. ¶ 185. Accord Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T, ¶ 193 (Nov. 16, 
1998); Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, ¶ 533 (May 7, 1997).
124  Kayishema & Ruzindana, op. cit., ¶ 188. 
125  Id. ¶ 603.
126  Akayesu, op. cit., ¶¶ 642–43.
127  Jamie Williamson, “The Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
on War Crimes,” 12 New Eng. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 51 (2005), p. 64.
128  Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR 96-3-T, Judgment & Sentence, ¶ 443 (Dec. 6, 
1999).
129  Williamson, “The Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda on 
War Crimes,” op. cit., p. 64 (2005).
130  Id., p. 65.
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3. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, & Ngeze131
No overview of the ICTR’s significant case law, however brief, would be 
complete without some remarks on Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza 
& Ngeze, also known as The Media Case. It involved three media executives, 
Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze, whose 
involvement with print and broadcast media led to their convictions for, 
inter alia, direct and public incitement to genocide.132 The Trial Chamber 
broke new legal ground in classifying mass hate speech as itself genocidal.133 
The hate speech at issue arose from the defendants’ connection to two princi-
pal media: Kangura, a widely read newspaper, which had, before and during 
the genocide, portrayed the Tutsi as “hypocrites, thieves, and killers” and 
Tutsi women as over-sexualized;134 and Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Col-
lines (RTLM), or “radio machete” as some referred to it, for the broadcasts 
not only promoted hatred of the Tutsi, but encouraged listeners to injure and 
kill them – going so far as to direct the killing of particular people.135 
All three defendants were convicted by the Trial Chamber under Article 
6(1) of the ICTR Statute because they employed media as, in effect, a weapon – 
and with an intent to kill.136 The defendants also instilled hatred in the pop-
ulation, coordinated their efforts with one another, and persecuted Tutsi.137 
The Trial Chamber, perhaps most significantly as a precedential matter, held 
members of the media responsible, not only for the content of what they 
published, but for its consequences: “Successful incitement to genocide being 
genocide, the purveyors of genocidal journalism and hate radio were con-
victed of deploying speech as a lethal weapon, as guilty of genocide as if they 
had personally wielded the machetes.”138
The Appeals Chamber softened some of the more progressive state-
ments of the Trial Chamber.139 In particular, while the Trial Chamber had 
allowed expression occurring before the genocide to be taken into account as 
131  Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A (Nov. 27, 2007) 
(hereinafter Nahimana, et al., AC) Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze, Case 
No. ICTR-99-52-A (Dec. 3, 2003) (hereinafter Nahima, et al. TC).
132  Nahimana et al. AC, op. cit., ¶ 6.
133  See Nahimana et al. TC, op. cit., ¶¶ 965–69, 974–75, 977A.
134  Id. ¶ 172.
135  Id. ¶¶ 487–88.
136  Id. ¶¶ 974, 975, 977A.
137  Catherine MacKinnon, “Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze,” 98 Am. J. Int’l 
L. 325 (2004) p. 328.
138  Id., pp. 328–29.
139  See generally David J. Bederman, “Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze,” 103 
Am. J. Int’l L. 97 (2004).
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continuing conduct if it caused criminal acts that fell within the Tribunal’s 
temporal jurisdiction, the Appeals Chamber found the connection “tenu-
ous” and reasoned that the longer the interval between the expression and 
the result, the more difficult it becomes to infer causation.140 In a similar 
vein, the Appeals Chamber found that recycled media, e.g., newspapers pub-
lished earlier or broadcasts in prior years that were read or heard later and 
arguably incited genocide, could, at most, constitute indirect incitement to 
genocide.141 
This view led the Appeals Chamber to set aside the most serious charges 
against Barayagwiza, a lawyer and cofounder of the RTLM – for, according 
to the Chamber, he did not exercise sufficient control over broadcasts dur-
ing the actual weeks of the genocide. In contrast, the Appeals Chamber had 
no difficulty sustaining his conviction for direct words and actions at the 
time insofar as they incited genocide.142 The Appeals Chamber also clarified 
that while hate speech is not, ipso facto, persecution, the encouragement of 
or calls for violence, combined with hate speech by the RTLM, were serious 
enough to constitute a crime against humanity and also could be character-
ized as acts of persecution as well as incitement of others to persecute.143 
4. Baglishema144
Prosecutor v. Baglishema bears mentioning because it marked the ICTR’s first 
acquittal, which a unanimous Appeals Chamber sustained. Like Akayesu, 
Baglishema had been a local official at the time of the genocide. The Pros-
ecutor indicted him on a theory of command responsibility for his alleged 
failure to “prevent, suppress, or punish crimes committed by subordinates.”145 
Even though the weight of the evidence against Bagilishema arguably could 
be equated roughly with the evidence in the case against Kayishema,146 the 
Trial Chamber found it insufficient to sustain a conviction.147 The Rwandan 
government said that it was shocked by the acquittal of such a high-level 
defendant.148 Carla Del Ponte, the ICTR’s Prosecutor at the time, replied that 
140  Nahimana, et al. AC, op. cit., ¶ 513.
141  Id. ¶ 410.
142  MacKinnon, “Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze,” op. cit., p. 99.
143  Id. ¶ 988.
144  Prosecutor v. Baglishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T (June 7, 2001).
145  Id. ¶ 37. 
146  Sean Libby, “(D)effective Control: Problems Arising From the Application of Non-Military 
Command Responsibility by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,” 23 Emory 
Int’l L.R. 201 (2009), p. 225.
147  Bagilishema, op. cit., ¶ 683.
148  “Rwanda Shocked at Arusha Acquittal,” BBC News, June 7, 2001.
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while the evidence had been sound and substantial, it had been poorly pre-
sented, and she later declined to renew the contract of the senior trial attor-
ney in charge of the case.149 Following his release, several European States 
refused to grant him asylum, although France ultimately accepted him into 
its territory.150
H. Conclusion
The ICTR has come under heavy criticism from multiple fronts. Its budget, 
arguably, is far out of proportion to the progress made by the Tribunal over 
(at the time of this writing) a period of nearly seventeen years.151 Many see 
it as a “fig leaf ” covering the international community’s shameful failure to 
intervene at the time of the genocide. And still others criticize the Court’s 
imposition of international due process and human rights standards on the 
people of Rwanda, who arguably should be the ones to determine the modal-
ity of transitional justice for a tragedy of such monumental proportions that 
took place against them in their own country. 
On the other hand, as this brief introduction suggests, the ICTR has estab-
lished a number of critical precedents in the realm of international criminal 
law, both substantive and procedural, and however imperfectly, has to some 
extent vindicated the idea that there should be no amnesty for the perpetra-
tors of genocide. 
As of March 9, 2011:
• the trials of fifty-two defendants have been completed, eight of whom were 
acquitted;
• the trials of twenty-one defendants continue;
• ten cases are on appeal; 
• one defendant, Jean Bosco Uwinkindi, is still awaiting trial; 
• two cases have been transferred to France for trial; and
• ten of the accused are still at large.152
149  “European Countries Refuse to take Acquitted Ex-Mayor,” Hirondelle News Agency, July 
17, 2001. 
150  “France Confirms it Will Take Acquitted Rwandan Mayor”, Hirondelle News Agency, Sep. 20, 
2001.
151  See Mahnoush A. Arsanjani & W. Michael Reisman, “The Law-in-Action of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court,” 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 385 (2005), p. 402.
152  Status of Cases, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Mar. 9, 2011, http://www
.unictr.org/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2011).
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Above all, perhaps, together with the ICTY, the ICTR galvanized support 
for the creation of the permanent International Criminal Court. Whether 
the latter’s aspirations, as set forth in the Preamble to the Rome Statute, e.g., 
“to put an end to impunity” and to ensure “that the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole . . . not go unpunished,”153 
will be realized remains to be seen.
153  United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, Rome, Italy, June 15–July 17, 1998, Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9* (July 17, 1998), 37 I.L.M. 
999 (1998).
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